Divorce Attorney Cape Town

The Marriage Rate Continues to Decline.


Living-Together

Will Valentine’s Day, always a popular moment for popping the question, see less marriage proposals this year than in past?

Information provided by Statistics South Africa in 2014 shows that the highest number of marriages was recorded in 2008 and the lowest number in 2012 which represents a decrease of more than 10% from those marriages recorded in 2008.

The age-old message about marriage that has been communicated by parents that “two are stronger than one” is now brushing up against a 21st-century reality: The number of married households in most countries including South Africa has fallen. Some researchers calls it “The Marriage Crisis”.  Today’s young adults in the US are on track to have the lowest rates of marriage by age 40 compared to any previous generation. If the current pace continues, more than 30% of millennial women will remain unmarried by age 40.

There are several reasons behind the declining marriage rate. The importance of marriage has been fading for years. More couples are living together without getting married, and some are raising families.

Also, marriage used to be the starting point for young adults. They got hitched early and built a life together. Now, many people feel they have to be more established, especially financially, before they walk down the aisle.

In 2013, the economist David H Author found that, “Sharp declines in the earning power of non-college males combined with the economic self-sufficiency of women rising educational attainment, falling gender gap and greater female control over fertility choices have reduced the economic value of marriage for women.”

Sweden has one of the lowest rates of marriage in the world and only 20% of the population bother to marry. In France and Britain it’s about a third. While marriage is in decline, unmarried cohabitation is on the rise.

U.Va. psychology professor Robert Emery says that, in the past, people thought of marriage as “more of a business-like relationship.” Women often received financial support from their husbands and women often provided household and child-rearing labour. Marriage rates fell and divorce rates rose when people started thinking less with their wallets and more with their hearts.

In the US the number of married households fell to 50.5% in 2012 from a high of about 72% in 1960. Among the less well educated, the number of married households has fallen even more. Research indicates that those who find themselves already lower on the socioeconomic ladder may be less likely to ever marry.

The United States has spent approximately one billion dollars since 2006 trying to educate low income Americans of the value of marriage with the goal of minimising divorce and single parent families. President Obama wrote in “The Audacity of Hope” that expanding such marriage education services to low income couples “should be something everybody can agree on.”

Researchers at UCLA however found that the poor not only value marriage just as much as those with more income, they actually have a better grip of the values needed to make a marriage work than wealthier people. Compared to the affluent, poor people “were more focused on the role of a good job, and an adequate income, and having some savings as the important factors in having a successful marriage,” the study’s lead author, social psychologist Benjamin Karney said.

Feminists have claimed that they, have the answer to Freud’s question about “What do women really want?” According to them, women’s utmost desire is to be equal to men and independent of them. Feminists created the myth that men and women are interchangeable and, except for donating sperm, women can be totally independent of men. However data in the US shows that by the time women reach their 30’s, about 70%of them are married and in marriage data we can certainly see the pull between a particular powerful set of values contesting with strong biological needs and the desire for equality struggle with the need for connection and relationship.

One should never underestimate marriage’s economic benefits. In a recent study in the US it was found that children being raised by married parents is generally connected to better economic wellbeing for young adults. So is being married as an adult and that growing up with both parents’ increases your odds of becoming highly educated, which in turn leads to higher odds of being married as an adult.

“Divorce causes a decrease in wealth that is larger than just splitting a couple’s assets in half,” said Jay Zagorsky, an Ohio State University economist. “If you really want to increase your wealth, get married and stay married.” “Marriage carries a sense of meaning, purpose, direction and stability that tends to benefit adults and particularly children. People who get married have an hope of sexual fidelity, and that fidelity tends to engender a sense of trust and security.

Latest marriage statistics in South Africa

Generally, the warmer months (beginning from September and peaking in December) are the most popular months for marriages. The results also show that marriages tends to peak in either March or April depending on the month of Easter holidays for that particular year. In 2012, the highest number of marriages took place in December. July recorded the lowest number of marriages. The results further indicate that, in 2012, the highest number of all marriages was registered in Gauteng (25,0%) and the lowest in Northern Cape (3,1%).

North West (76,1%) had the highest proportion of its marriages conducted by civil marriage officers whereas Western Cape recorded the highest proportion (44,2%) of marriages conducted by religious marriage officers.

A majority of the marriages in 2012 for both bridegrooms and brides were first-time marriages. For bridegrooms, there were (82,9%) bachelors, (3,3%) divorcees and (1,3%) widowers. For the brides, (87,4%) were spinsters whilst (2,2%) were divorcees and (1,0%) were widows. Provincial distribution shows that all provinces had the highest proportion of both bridegrooms and brides marrying for the first time, particularly brides in KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo where 90,2% and 90,8% respectively were spinsters at the time of marriage

Irrespective of their marital status, men generally married women who had never been married (spinsters). Thus, (94,2%) spinsters, (1,0%) divorcees and (0,9%) widows were married by bachelors. In addition, irrespective of the fact that more divorcees and widowers married spinsters, the proportion of male divorcees who married female divorcees (16,2%) was higher than the proportion that married widows (1,2%). Similarly, the proportion of widowers who married widows (15,0%) was higher than the proportion that married female divorcees (1,5%).

The average ages of first-time brides remained at 29 years, while for bridegrooms the average age was 33 years. The average ages for divorcees for male were generally at 52 years. In comparison, the average age of female divorcees increased to 47 years. Despite the fact that men generally marry younger women, data in indicate that (14,8%) bridegrooms were younger than their brides whilst  (7,6%) were of the same age as their brides.

Source: http://voices.news24.com/bertus-preller/2015/02/marriage-rate-decline/

Bertus Preller

Divorce and Family Law Lawyer

Bertus Preller & Associates Inc., Cape Town

Website: http://www.divorcelaws.co.za and http://www.divorceattorney.co.za

Twitter: @bertuspreller

Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/divorceattorneys

Tel: 021 422 2461

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No maintenance for a sacked lover


Not so long ago I wrote an article about the fact that in South African law there is in fact no such thing as a common law marriage and that partners that cohabitates or live together in a domestic partnership will in fact have no right to claim maintenance from one another. In fact, this was exactly what the Supreme Court of Appeal ruled this week in the matter of McDonald v Young (292/10) [2011] ZASCA 31 on 24 March 2011.

The facts of this case were as follows.

The parties were involved in a relationship and had cohabited, as man and wife, for approximately seven years from June 1999 until May 2006. After the relationship broke down, the appellant instituted an action against the respondent in the Western Cape High Court (Cape Town) for an order declaring that a joint venture agreement existed between the parties in respect of immovable property (the property) situate at Port Island, Port St Francis, in the Eastern Cape, alternatively, for an order that the respondent pay maintenance to the appellant. The high court (Veldhuizen J) found that the appellant had failed to prove the existence of a joint venture agreement and, in respect of the maintenance claim, that there was no duty on the respondent to support the appellant. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court with the leave of the high court.

The issues on appeal, as in the high court, wer whether the appellant has established the existence of a joint venture agreement between the parties, alternatively, whether the respondent is under a duty (by operation of law, or alternatively, by virtue of a tacit contract) to support the appellant subsequent to their cohabitation.

Shortly after the parties were introduced to each other the appellant took up residence with the respondent at her farm in Knysna. The appellant’s main business interest was the promotion and marketing of surfing and surfboard products. During 1999, the appellant and his Durban-based brother had been in the process of establishing a new business, Inter Surf Africa Exporters (ISAE), which was involved in the manufacture and export of surfboards. The appellant did not possess any meaningful assets and had very limited income. The respondent, on the other hand, was a woman of considerable means. She had an annual cash income in excess of R1,3m and possessed substantial assets. When the appellant and the respondent met, they were 59 and 54 years of age, respectively. It was common cause that the appellant had not been in receipt of a regular income and had, for a time, during the course of the relationship, received a monthly allowance from the respondent.

The appellant’s claim to a half-share in the property was based on an express oral joint venture agreement concluded by the parties. The appellant testified that the terms of the agreement were that the respondent would contribute financially to the acquisition, completion and refurbishment of the property while the appellant would contribute his time and expertise to oversee the development of the property. According to the appellant, it was agreed that they would each share jointly in the property. The appellant testified that the primary objective of the agreement was to ensure that he gained financial independence. Despite the fact that the property was to have been registered in both their names, it was subsequently agreed, according to him, that the property would be registered in the respondent’s name for tax purposes. It was common cause that the initial written agreement had reflected both their names as purchasers of the property.

It was contended, on behalf of the appellant, that the high court had erred in failing to accept and rely on the appellant’s evidence regarding the agreement, having particular regard to the fact that his evidence was unchallenged. It was further contended that the respondent’s failure to testify was fatal to her case and that this court was obliged to accept his unchallenged evidence in respect of both the agreement and the claim for maintenance.

In our law it is settled that uncontradicted evidence is not necessarily acceptable or sufficient to discharge an onus. In Kentz (Pty) Ltd v Power, Cloete J undertook a careful review of relevant cases where this principle was endorsed and applied. The learned judge pointed out that the most succinct statement of the law in this regard is to be found in Siffman v Kriel, where Innes CJ said:

‘It does not follow, because evidence is uncontradicted, that therefore it is true . . . The story told by the person on whom the onus rests may be so improbable as not to discharge it.’

It was thus necessary to consider the appellant’s evidence in detail. It was clear from the judgment of the high court that it was mindful that the appellant’s evidence, in order to be reliable, had to be credible. The high court, on the evidence, reached the conclusion that the respondent had ‘initially intended that the contract should reflect the [appellant] as one of the purchasers’. However, it did not accept his evidence in its entirety and went on to find that the appellant had failed to prove the existence of a joint venture agreement.

In the Judge’s view, there were a number of unsatisfactory aspects in the appellant’s evidence. It was significant noted by the court how the appellant’s claim against the respondent has developed over time. During May 2006 and shortly after the parties parted ways, they met, in the presence of their respective attorneys, with a view to settle the disputes between them. The appellant’s evidence regarding the claim he had advanced at that meeting, was as follows:

‘So the idea was to try and settle the split between yourself and Mrs Young? — I accept ─ I looked at it like that because it did look like we weren’t going to get together again, so I assumed that that was the reason.

And what were your claims that day? — My claims that day with regards to my share of Port St Francis, with regards to my contribution I had made over the seven years and discussion on my contract with the bakkie.’

This was in stark contrast to his testimony in the magistrate’s court to the effect that he had, at the time of the meeting, been under the impression that he did not have a claim against the respondent and that the claim had ‘materialised some time afterwards when I . . . approached some attorneys for advice’. The appellant’s explanation for the contradiction, that he had meant to convey that he had not yet ‘implemented’ his claim, is, in my view, unsatisfactory. The very purpose of the meeting was an attempt to resolve the dispute between himself and the respondent without the need to resort to litigation.

On 17 July 2006, and following upon the May 2006 meeting, the appellant’s attorney wrote a letter to the respondent’s attorney, which was intended to ‘motivate and substantiate’ the appellant’s claim against the respondent ‘as comprehensively as possible’. (The Court’s emphasis.) It was recorded in the letter that the appellant believed that a universal partnership had existed between the parties and that he was entitled to ‘some form of compensation’ (The Court’s emphasis.) for his contribution to the partnership. It is instructive that no mention was made of the appellant’s half-share in the property, despite the fact that the appellant testified that he had given his attorney instructions in this regard and that he (the appellant) had had sight of the letter prior to it being dispatched. The development of the appellant’s claim over time is not without significance.

During the period that the parties were cohabiting, the appellant drafted numerous agreements and proposals, the purpose of which was to define the financial relationship between him and the respondent. On 24 July 2003, the respondent executed a sole agency mandate in terms of which she appointed the appellant as agent to sell the property and undertook to pay a commission of ten per cent to him. It was the appellant’s testimony that the commission he would have earned was to have provided him with financial security. The appellant agreed that he had, during October 2004, drafted an agreement, aimed at resolving the constant disputes he and the respondent had had regarding his financial security. The salient terms of this agreement were that (i) he was appointed as sole agent to sell two properties, including the property which is the subject of this dispute; (ii) he would be paid a commission of ten per cent for securing the sale of the properties; and (iii) the respondent would purchase government retail bonds to the value of R500 000 on behalf of the appellant. It was also his evidence that the relationship between him and the respondent had been particularly volatile at that time and his intention, in drafting this agreement, was to achieve clarification regarding his financial position.

It was surprising that the appellant failed to mention his half-share in the property in the October 2004 proposal. This was even more surprising when regard is had to his evidence that he was at that time concerned, as there was uncertainty regarding his financial future. The wording of this proposal, as well as the agency agreement, excludes the possibility that he had acquired a share in the property. It was in the court’s view extremely improbable that had the parties agreed in 1999 when the property was purchased that they would be joint owners thereof, the appellant would not, in 2004, have recorded his right to, or even a claim for, a half-share in a proposal aimed at settling outstanding matters between him and the respondent.

Counsel for the appellant attached great importance to the fact that the initial agreement had recorded both parties’ names as purchasers. The appellant assumed that both names were inserted on the instructions of the respondent. There was no evidence to support this assumption. Even if such instructions did emanate from the respondent, it does not necessarily follow, as was found by the high court, that this meant that there was an agreement between the parties as alleged by the appellant. The recording of both parties’ names is nothing more than an indicator pointing towards the conclusion of an agreement and it is a factor to be considered in conjunction with the probabilities.

There were a number of factors that support the respondent’s denial of the existence of a joint venture agreement between the parties. These included: the claim as articulated at the meeting with their legal representatives shortly after the break-up, the letter written after that meeting, various agreements drafted by the appellant, and the unsatisfactory and often contradictory evidence given by the appellant. The court mentioned that the appellant contradicted himself on one of the essential terms of the agreement, namely, whether it was agreed that he would be entitled to half of the proceeds of the sale of the property only or the property together with its contents.

The appellant bore the onus of proving the agreement upon which he relied as well as the terms thereof. Having regard to the deficiencies in the appellant’s evidence and the probabilities, it cannot be said that it measures up to the standard required for acceptability in respect of the existence of the joint venture agreement. In Da Mata v Otto NO, Van Blerk JA, dealing with the approach to be adopted when deciding probabilities, said:

‘In regard to the appellant’s sworn statements alleging the oral agreement, it does not follow that because these allegations were not contradicted ─ the only witness who could have disputed them had died ─ they should be taken as proof of the facts involved. Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed., vol. VII, p. 260, states that the mere assertion of any witness does not of itself need to be believed, even though he is unimpeached in any manner, because to require such belief would be to give a quantative and impersonal measure to testimony. The learned author in this connection at p. 262 cites the following passage from a decision quoted:

“It is not infrequently supposed that a sworn statement is necessarily proof, and that, if uncontradicted, it established the fact involved. Such is by no means the law. Testimony, regardless of the amount of it, which is contrary to all reasonable probabilities or conceded facts ─ testimony which no sensible man can believe ─ goes for nothing; while the evidence of a single witness to a fact, there being nothing to throw discredit thereon, cannot be disregarded.”’

The appellant’s testimony was contrary to all reasonable probabilities and, despite the fact that it was unchallenged, counts for ‘nothing’. In assessing the probabilities, the conclusion seems to be inescapable that the appellant has not discharged the onus resting on him. It follows that the appellant was not entitled to the relief sought in respect of the main claim.

The court considered the alternative claim for maintenance and dealt first with the argument that such a duty existed by operation of law. In South African law, certain family relationships, such as parent and child and husband and wife, create a duty of support. The common law has been extended in line with the Constitution to protect contractual rights of support in the same way as the common law duty of support. In Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality Intervening), this High Court of Appeal recognised a contractual right to support arising out of a marriage in terms of Islamic law for purposes of a dependant’s action. In Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund, the common law action by a spouse, for loss of support against the wrongdoer who unlawfully kills the other spouse, was extended to partners in a same-sex permanent life relationship similar in other respects to marriage, who had tacitly undertaken reciprocal duties of support. The Constitutional Court in Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa & another, found that the common law duty of support, could, in certain circumstances, be extended to persons in a same-sex relationship. Madala J, writing for the court, commented as follows:

‘The law attaches a duty of support to various family relationships, for example, husband and wife, and parent and child. In a society where the range of family formations has widened, such a duty of support may be inferred as a matter of fact in certain cases of persons involved in permanent, same-sex life partnerships. Whether such a duty of support exists or not will depend on the circumstances of each case.’

Counsel for the appellant relied on Kahn, Amod and Du Plessis in support of his contention that a legal duty of support rests on the respondent. This contention was misplaced. In both Amod and Khan, the parties in respect of whom a duty of support had been alleged had been married to each other in terms of Islamic law. The ratio of the court, in both cases, was that the marriage between the parties had given rise to reciprocal contractual duties of support on the part of the parties to that marriage. In Du Plessis, Cloete JA, having had regard to the facts of that matter, concluded that the plaintiff had proved that the deceased had undertaken to support him and that the deceased had owed the plaintiff a contractual duty of support. The learned judge of appeal said:

‘In the present case the case for drawing an inference that the plaintiff and the deceased undertook reciprocal duties of support is even stronger. The plaintiff and the deceased would have married one another if they could have done so. As this course was not open to them, they went through a “marriage” ceremony which was as close as possible to a heterosexual marriage ceremony. The fact that the plaintiff and the deceased went through such a “marriage” ceremony and did so before numerous witnesses gives rise to the inference that they intended to do the best they could to publicise to the world that they intended their relationship to be, and to be regarded as, similar in all respects to that of a heterosexual married couple, ie one in which the parties would have a reciprocal duty of support. That having been their intention, it must be accepted as a probability that they tacitly undertook a reciprocal duty of support to one another.

Further support for this finding is the fact that the plaintiff and the deceased thereafter lived together as if they were legally married in a stable and permanent relationship until the deceased was killed some 11 years later; they were accepted by their family and friends as partners in such a relationship; they pooled their income and shared their family responsibilities; each of them made a will in which the other partner was appointed his sole heir; and when the plaintiff was medically boarded, the deceased expressly stated that he would support the plaintiff financially and in fact did so until he died.’

Amod, Khan and Du Plessis were decided on the basis of contracts entered into by the respective parties, and are not authority for the contention that there is a duty of support, by operation of law, on the respondent to maintain the appellant.

The question whether the relationship between the parties, a heterosexual couple who choose to live together, free from the bonds of matrimony, gives rise to a legal duty of support, could in the Judge’s view, be answered with reference to Volks NO v Robinson & others. In that matter the Constitutional Court was concerned with the interpretation and constitutionality of s 2(1), read with s 1, of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990, which confers on surviving spouses the right to claim maintenance from the estates of their deceased spouses if they are not able to support themselves. The court had to determine whether the exclusion of survivors of permanent life partnerships from the protection of the Act constituted unfair discrimination. Skweyiya J, writing for the majority, referred with approval to the comments made by O’Regan J in Dawood & another v Minister of Home Affairs & others; Shalabi & another v Minister of Home Affairs & others; Thomas & another v Minister of Home Affairs & others that:

‘Marriage and the family are social institutions of vital importance. Entering into and sustaining a marriage is a matter of intense private significance to the parties to that marriage for they make a promise to one another to establish and maintain an intimate relationship for the rest of their lives which they acknowledge obliges them to support one another, to live together and to be faithful to one another.

The institutions of marriage and the family are important social institutions that provide for the security, support and companionship of members of our society and bear an important role in the rearing of children. The celebration of a marriage gives rise to moral and legal obligations, particularly the reciprocal duty of support placed upon spouses and their joint responsibility for supporting and raising children born of the marriage. These legal obligations perform an important social function.’

The Constitutional Court was of the view that the law may distinguish between married people and unmarried people and may, in appropriate circumstances, accord benefits to married people which it does not accord to unmarried people. The learned justice reasoned as follows in para 55:

‘There are a wide range of legal privileges and obligations that are triggered by the contract of marriage. In a marriage the spouses’ rights are largely fixed by law and not by agreement, unlike in the case of parties who cohabit without being married.’

The court found that whilst there was a reciprocal duty of support between married persons, ‘no duty of support arises by operation of law in the case of unmarried cohabitants’. This was an unequivocal statement of the law by the Constitutional Court. Skweyiya J went on to state that to the extent that any obligations arise between cohabitants during the subsistence of their relationship, these arise by agreement and only to the extent of that agreement.

The court also considered whether a contractual duty of support towards the appellant existed. The argument, presented as a second alternative to the claim based on a joint venture, was that the court should find that the parties had entered into a tacit agreement in terms of which the respondent had agreed to support the appellant even after the end of their relationship.

The facts upon which the appellant relies in support of his claim that the respondent had assumed a duty of support towards him are the following:

(i) He and the respondent had lived together as if they were legally married in a stable and permanent relationship;

(ii) The respondent had supported him during the seven-year period that they had resided together and the appellant had been dependent on such support. She had given him an allowance, provided transport for him and paid for entertainment and overseas holidays;

(iii) The respondent had, in a series of wills, made extensive provision for financial support of the appellant in the event of her death;

(iv) The respondent was a wealthy woman while he had no assets and very limited income;

(v) He had contributed to the maintenance of and increase in value of the respondent’s estate, often at the expense of his own business interests; (vi) The appellant was reliant on an income from employment and could not, due to his advanced age, guarantee for how much longer he would be able to earn a living; and

(vii) The respondent had advised the appellant that she had sufficient funds to support both of them.

The argument that the parties had entered into a tacit agreement regarding maintenance cannot be sustained for a number of reasons. First, the reliance on a tacit contract is inconsistent with the appellant’s evidence. The appellant believed and gave evidence to the effect that he and the respondent had concluded an express agreement in respect of the property, the aim of which was to ensure that he was financially independent. Implicit in this is the intention that he would not have to rely on the respondent, or any other person, for financial support. In the circumstances, the appellant could not have formed the intention to contract tacitly with the respondent. Having regard to his evidence that the purpose of the joint venture agreement was to render him financially independent, the appellant could not at the same time have contemplated, that the respondent would continue to support him for the rest of his life. A tacit contract must not extend to more than the parties contemplated. In Rand Trading Co Ltd v Lewkewitsch the parties had erroneously assumed that there was a contract in existence between them. The court did not accept the argument that the company’s conduct in recognising the existence of the lease, paying the rent and otherwise performing in terms of the contract had created a binding contract. Solomon J said:

‘But I think the answer to that argument is a very clear one, and it is this ─ that all these facts are explained on the simple ground that both parties erroneously assumed that there was a contract in existence between them . . . And the mere fact . . . that both parties erroneously assumed that there was a contract in existence at that date altogether precludes us from now inferring a new contract.’

The appellant’s stated belief, that there was an express contract between him and the respondent in respect of the property, precludes this court from drawing an inference to the effect that the parties had entered into a tacit agreement the terms of which were inconsistent with the express agreement to which he testified. It was not open for the appellant to contend that if the court disbelieved his evidence that a joint venture agreement had been concluded, the court should infer from the proved facts that a tacit contract had come into existence, because such an inference cannot be drawn where it would conflict with what he said was the actual position. A litigant can plead, but not testify, in the alternative.

Secondly, the appellant’s evidence was that the respondent’s attitude had always been that in the event that their relationship ended, he would receive no financial benefit from her. This conduct, on the part of the respondent, is inconsistent with a tacit agreement to support the appellant. The appellant’s explanation for drafting the various proposals regarding the financial relationship between him and the respondent was as follows:

‘Well, the motivation behind it at that particular time, we were going through quite a patchy period; we were arguing and not agreeing on a lot of things. And it appeared to me that all of a sudden my situation could alter and I’d be left standing high and dry. And I discussed it with Lesley [the respondent] and I felt that if we had something in writing, and if that did occur at least I had something to fall back on . . . ’. (Emphasis added.)

It is trite that a tacit contract is established by conduct. In order to establish a tacit contract, the conduct of the parties must be such that it justifies an inference that there was consensus between them. There must be evidence of conduct which justifies an inference that the parties intended to, and did, contract on the terms alleged. It is clear from the appellant’s evidence that there was no consensus between the parties. The appellant, on his own testimony, was uncertain about his financial future. He realised that he would only be entitled to what had been agreed between the parties, hence his desire to have a written contract ‘to fall back on’. The respondent’s attitude, as testified to by the appellant, that he would leave the relationship without any financial benefit, is an indicator that she had not, tacitly or otherwise, agreed to support the appellant. I am not satisfied that this court can conclude, from all the relevant proven facts and circumstances, that a tacit contract, in terms of which the respondent undertook to financially maintain the appellant, for as long as he needed such maintenance, came into existence.

For those reasons, the appellant’s maintenance claim which is premised on a legal, alternatively, a contractual duty, failed.

Bertus Preller is a Divorce and Family Law Attorney in Cape Town and has more than 20 years experience in law and 13 years as a practising attorney. He specializes in Family law and Divorce Law at Abrahams and Gross Attorneys Inc. in Cape Town. Bertus is also the Family Law expert on Health24.com and on the expert panel of Law24.com. His areas of expertise are Divorce Law, Family Law, Divorce Mediation, Custody (care and contact) of children, same sex marriages, unmarried fathers rights, domestic violence matters and international divorce law.

Free Sample Cohabitation Agreement


Cohabitation  – Living  Together Agreement

The following form is intended for illustrative purposes only. You and your attorney can use this sample as a guide in drafting a cohabitation agreement that best protects your interests and complies with the laws in effect where you live.

Why do I need a Cohabitation Agreement?

A Cohabitation Agreement sets out the financial terms of a couple’s relationship, and provides protection for the parties upon death, or should the relationship fail. 

Who should use a Cohabitation Agreement?

Any unmarried couple in a relationship and living with each other could find this agreement useful.

Also known as:

  • Conditions of Cohabitation
  • Cohabitation Contract

It is advisable that you contact an attorney in regard to drafting such an agreement.

COHABITATION AGREEMENT

Between

(The 1st Party)

and

(The 2nd Party)

PREAMBLE

WHEREAS

1.  The parties are currently living together in a domestic partnership and intend to continue living together in this arrangement;

2.  The parties wish to define their respective proprietary rights and liabilities arising from their domestic partnership arrangement;

3.  The parties each acknowledge that they enter into this agreement voluntarily, without any duress or undue influence, and that each has had the opportunity to consult with an attorney of his/her choice;

THE PARTIES AGREE:

1.         Marital Status

The joint residency of the parties shall in no way render the parties married in any way, whether by operation of common law or any other law.

2.         The Agreement

2.1       This Agreement consists solely of the mutual promises contained herein and the mutual promises of each party to act as the living companion and partner to the other.

2.2       This Agreement fully contemplates and compensates any and all services provided by either party for the benefit of the other during the course of their joint residency. The furnishing of sexual services shall in no way be construed as consideration for this Agreement.

3.         Disclosure of Current Financial Status

Each party has fully and completely, to the best of his/her knowledge, disclosed to the other party his/her current financial condition including all assets and liabilities. Each party has attached a balance sheet to this agreement indicating his/her current assets and liabilities with the understanding that this balance sheet reflects his/her current financial status to the best of his/her ability.

4.         Division of Living Expenses

Necessary and jointly approved living expenses shall be divided between the parties as below:

4.1       The 1st Party shall contribute _____________ percent ( ____%) per month;

4.2       The 2nd Party shall contribute _____________ percent ( ____%) per month.

The parties shall contribute their monthly pro rata contributions into the joint savings/current account of the parties. Any property purchased using funds in this account shall be considered to be the joint property of the parties and owned according to the respective party’s percentage of contribution as stated above. Either party may draw upon this checking account.

5.         Separate Property

The following properties shall be kept by the parties as the separate property of the recipient and the said properties shall not be subject to division at the termination of this Agreement:

5.1       All and any property, real or personal, owned by a specific party at the date of execution of this Agreement;

5.2       Individual gifts, bequests or inheritances acquired before or after the execution of this Agreement;

5.3       Individual earnings, salary or wages acquired before or after the execution of this Agreement;

5.4       All income or proceeds derived from the aforementioned properties.

6.         Commingling of Property

All commingled property shall be presumed to be joint property of the parties unless otherwise agreed.

7.         Joint Property

All property acquired by the parties after the date of execution of this Agreement and before the termination of this Agreement and procured jointly with joint resources and funds shall be considered joint property of the parties with each party possessing his/her aforementioned percentage of ownership.

8.         Division of Property upon Termination

Upon termination of this Agreement or termination of the joint residency, all jointly owned property shall be divided among the parties according to their pro rata share listed above.  If the parties are unable to agree on the appropriate division of joint property, they may appoint an independent and mutually agreed upon Third-party to act as Appraiser.  The Appraiser shall divide the property among the parties according to his/her pro rata share.

9.         Duty of Good Faith and Confidentiality

9.1       This Agreement creates a fiduciary relationship between the parties in which each party agrees to act with the utmost of good faith and fair dealing toward the other in the management of their joint property and in all other aspects of this Agreement.

9.2       Without obtaining a parties’ written consent in advance, a party shall not directly or indirectly publish, or cause to be published, any diary, memoir, letter, story, photograph, interview, article, essay, account, or description or depiction of any kind whatsoever, whether fictionalised or not, concerning the relationship or any other aspect of a parties’ personal, business or financial affairs, or assist or provide information to others in connection with the publication or dissemination of any such material or excerpts thereof.

10.       Legal Names of Parties

Each party shall retain his/her legal name, including surname, as printed and signed in this Agreement.

11.       Duration of Agreement

This Agreement shall become effective at the date of execution and shall remain in effect until termination. Termination shall be effected by written notice by either party, cessation of the joint residency by either party or death of either party.  Either party may terminate this Agreement unilaterally at any time.

12.       Death of Party

Upon the death of either party, the surviving party waives all rights to support by the deceased party.

13.       Complete Agreement

It is the intent of the parties that this Agreement be the full and complete agreement between the parties regarding their joint residency.  No variation of this agreement shall be of force or effect unless reduced to writing and signed by both parties.

14.       Severability of Provisions

Should any paragraph or provision of this Agreement be held invalid, void, or otherwise unenforceable, it is the intent of the parties that the remaining portions shall nevertheless continue in full force and effect without impairment.

15.       Governing Law

This Agreement shall be governed by, interpreted and construed in accordance with the laws of the Republic of South Africa.

DATED at                                     this                  day of                                    201_

AS WITNESSES:

 

1.

 

2.

 

DATED at                                     this                  day of                                    201_

AS WITNESSES:

 

1.

 

2.

 

Compiled by:

Bertus Preller

Family Law Attorney

Abrahams and Gross Inc.

Cohabitation Agreements in South Africa


Cohabitation Agreements

None of the consequences of a marriage automatically ensue if partners simply live together. Thus life partners do not automatically have the right to share in the other’s property during or after the relationship. Life partners are able to use contracts to achieve a measure of protection as against each other as well as against third parties. They may for example purchase assets jointly, or jointly enter into lease agreements, credit agreements etc. in such cases the terms of each contract will determine the rights, duties and obligations of each of the life partners. Usually the life partners are the joint owners of the assets acquired and joint debtors in respect of the obligations incurred.

Where the life partners are the joint owners neither of them can exclude the other from using or controlling such assets. Unless they have entered into a partnership agreement either of them may alienate his/her own share of the jointly owned assets without the other’s consent. If the life partnership breaks down and the life partners can’t agree how to divide the assets either of them may institute the action communi dividundo in which event the court will then appoint a receiver or liquidator to divide the assets.

It is best that life partners regulate their rights in terms of a cohabitation agreement. In this agreement they may for example undertake that they will maintain each other while the relationship lasts, agree to posy separation maintenance, regulate ownership of the property each of them owned before the start of the relationship, agree on property acquired after the relationship started, agree on occupation of the common home during the relationship and after termination and so forth.

Partners living together should enter into a cohabitation agreement. I have dealt with numerous disputes over the years where partners terminated a relationship with or without an agreement in place and it is usually where there is no agreement in place that the turmoil starts.

Bertus Preller

Family and Divorce Law Attorney

Abrahams and Gross Inc.

 

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